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Restoring the Rule of Law through
Department of Justice Reform
CLAIRE O. FINKELSTEIN | RICHARD W. PAINTER

As the nation’s principal law enforcement agency, the Department of Justice (DOJ) plays a unique role in protecting rule of law and, therefore, U.S.
democracy. Despite the fact that the attorney general is appointed by the
president and serves at the president’s pleasure, a recognition of the comparable independence of the DOJ from the political priorities of the rest
of the executive branch has been critical for maintaining the department’s
integrity and credibility over the course of its roughly 150-year history. To
assure the American public that the actions of the DOJ are based on legitimate prosecutorial discretion rather than on political favoritism or electoral
politics, prosecutions must be politically neutral and motivated only by the
goal of evenhanded enforcement of the law, without prejudice produced by
presidential political aims. The DOJ articulates its mission as to “enforce
the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the law,”1
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an aim that, when fulfilled, allows the department to serve as the guardian of the rule of law for the country as a whole. When the DOJ faithfully
conforms to both law and ethics, it powerfully reinforces the foundations of
democratic governance.
But the flip side is also true: the DOJ is particularly well situated to
corrupt the rule of law.2 When the department treats legal compliance as
a creative exercise in public relations and political manipulation, it leads
to the disintegration of rule of law values, not just in the DOJ but also in
government as a whole. In that case, it threatens the very foundations of
democratic governance. In short, any attempt to justify distortions of law by
claiming the authority of law does disproportionate damage, given that such
distortions strike at the very concept of legality itself.
With these principles in mind, in the summer of 2020, the authors of
this chapter were reporters for a bipartisan working group hosted by the
Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law (CERL) at the University of Pennsylvania, in conjunction with Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington (CREW), to examine the conduct of the Department of Justice during the tenure of former Attorney General William Barr.3 The working group and consultants to the project consisted of legal and intelligence
experts, including former high-ranking Justice Department officials in Republican administrations, assisted by students from CERL’s 2020 summer
internship program. The working group presented a number of serious concerns relating to the functioning of the DOJ in 2019–2020, which it presented in a report on October 12, 2020. 4 The CERL/CREW report examined
questions about the conduct of Attorney General Barr during the roughly
twenty months of his tenure at the DOJ and found serious misconduct.5 A
core theme that arose across the many different areas of the DOJ’s functions
was the extreme politicization of the department.6
One of the most concerning aspects of this politicization during the last
administration was the DOJ’s systematic use of its powers of investigation
against critics of Donald Trump or individuals who had a role in initiating
the FBI investigation into the Trump campaign’s contact with Russia—an
investigation known as Crossfire Hurricane.7 The politicized investigations
into the origins of the Russia probe fostered an atmosphere of suspicion
and intimidation relating to the FBI and the intelligence community more
generally. The politicization of the department regarding the intelligence
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community weakened U.S. national security by creating doubt about the
motivations of intelligence investigations and federal law enforcement in
general, damage that will only be repaired with great effort. In addition, the
attacks on the intelligence community were amplified in Congress, where
three Senate committees placed more than fifty former Obama-era officials
on a subpoena list based on their role in initiating or recommending the
Crossfire Hurricane probe, 8 contributing to an atmosphere of public suspicion of intelligence operations.9 Such public relations campaigns across the
branches of the government are dangerous to U.S. democracy and weaken
the separation of powers.
After October 2020, when the CERL/CREW report was issued, matters got rapidly worse. Trump’s politicization of the DOJ came to a head in
the 2020 presidential campaign, when Attorney General Barr lent his pre-
election support to the discredited view that mail-in voting would produce a
fraudulent result, helping to pave the way for President Trump’s post-election
assault on the integrity of the election.10 Barr, however, was not willing to
stay the course with Donald Trump’s assault on the election, a matter that
Trump greatly resented. On December 1, 2020, Barr gave a widely circulated
interview in which he rejected Trump’s claim that there had been fraud in
the election.11 Two weeks later, Barr resigned, but not without furnishing the
public with a sycophantic resignation letter that praised Trump’s presidency
to the hilt.12 Trump complained about Barr’s change of heart in a rally in
July 2021, saying that Barr “became a different man when the Democrats
viciously stated that they wanted to impeach him.” According to the Washington Examiner, Trump’s complaint about Democrats wanting to impeach
Trump referred to the CERL/CREW report, which recommended that Congress open an impeachment investigation on Barr.13
Barr’s successor, Acting Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen, also came
under extraordinary pressure from President Trump to declare that there
was “fraud” in the November 2020 election, and Jeffrey Clark, also a political appointee in DOJ, prepared a draft letter to state legislators in Georgia
declaring that there was fraud in the election, which Rosen refused to sign.14
Had DOJ issued this statement, Trump might have used it to invalidate the
election, whether by declaring martial law and forcing a new election or otherwise. DOJ thus came perilously close to providing legal cover for an attempted coup.
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Shortly before he would step down, Barr also revealed in a letter he sent to
members of Congress that in October 2020 he had secretly sought to entrench
the department’s scrutiny of the origins of the Russia probe by elevating the
then U.S. attorney for Connecticut, John Durham, to the post of special counsel.15 As U.S. attorney, Durham had been conducting a counter-investigation
into Crossfire Hurricane and the FBI’s investigation into the Trump campaign and its ties to Russia.16 Many were highly critical of this move. Former
Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal, for example, who wrote the special
counsel rules as a Department of Justice staff member in 1999, characterized
this appointment as violating both the special counsel rules and “fundamental democratic principles.”17 He argued it was a “devious move” by Barr, “designed to entrench a politically appointed prosecutor in a new administration
and make it hard for President Biden to appoint a replacement.”18
Ultimately, however, Durham did not play the role in the 2020 election
for which Trump had hoped. In October, Barr stated that Durham would not
have a report ready prior to the election, an announcement to which Trump
reacted with great anger and disappointment.19 Although the Durham investigation has now run longer than Special Counsel Mueller’s investigation
itself, Attorney General Merrick Garland wisely chose to allow the investigation to continue in the Biden administration, though Durham is no longer a
U.S. attorney.20 As of this writing, Durham has charged several individuals
but still has not released his report or given a timeline for wrapping up his
investigation. Whether it will be a balanced, evenhanded assessment of the
origins of the Russia probe or the politicized instrument for which Trump
had hoped remains to be seen, but the decision not to issue a report prior to
November 3, 2020, may have avoided the worst politicization of the department by minimizing its impact on the election. It may also have helped to
constrain Trump from even more egregious attempts to use the department
post-election to further the attack on Biden’s clear victory.
Nevertheless, disturbing revelations about Barr and the DOJ he led continue to emerge, and it remains the case that Barr allowed the department
to be hijacked for partisan political purposes. In March 2021, federal judge
Amy Berman Jackson wrote that Barr and the Justice Department were “disingenuous” in attempting to hold back internal DOJ documents relating to
the Mueller report. She found that their claims “are so inconsistent with
evidence in the record, they are not worthy of credence.”21 Judge Jackson
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was the second federal judge to make such a finding. In 2020, Judge Reggie
Walton stated that Barr provided a “distorted” and “misleading” account
of the Mueller report to the American people, which led the judge to question Barr’s “credibility” and, with it, the department’s representation of the
report to the court.22 As we discuss below, the public also learned of secret
DOJ subpoenas seeking communications records of reporters in 2017 during
the Trump administration. 23 Those startling disclosures were followed by
the news that in 2017 and 2018, the DOJ subpoenaed Apple for data from the
accounts of Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee, their aides,
and their family members, in an attempt to identify who was behind leaks of
classified information early on in the Trump years.24
This chapter seeks to identify some key areas where repair is badly
needed following a period in which the department’s core values were severely compromised. The chapter also presents some specific measures to
hasten the process of repair and put the DOJ on the path toward regaining
its credibility and its trusted role as defender of the rule of law.

Politicization of the Department of Justice

Although the damage to the rule of law in the DOJ and the obstacles to
repair are arguably even more formidable now than they were following
President Nixon’s resignation, it is worth heeding the example of Attorney
General Edward Levi, a Republican, who was appointed by President Ford
in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal.25 Levi’s reforms were inspired by
what his then aide, now federal judge, Mark Wolf recalls as his philosophy of
the executive branch “acting judicially.”26 The reforms included guidelines
for FBI surveillance and other activities, reinforcing the ideals of professionalism and adherence to separation of powers and the rule of law, as well
as new DOJ rules and structures to assure the integrity of DOJ actions. 27
According to Levi, “Nothing can more weaken the quality of life or more
imperil the realization of the goals we all hold dear than our failure to make
clear by words and deed that our law is not an instrument of partisan purpose, and is not to be used in ways which are careless to the higher values
which are within all of us.”28 Levi’s words were powerful, but his reforms
were vulnerable. Embodied as they were in DOJ policies and practices, these
reforms could be easily changed by a subsequent attorney general.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036891

126

Overcoming Trumpery

During the Carter administration, Attorney General Griffin Bell chose
to maintain the measures Levi put in place.29 Bell also imposed strict limits
on FBI investigations and protocols for communication between the White
House and the DOJ to enhance the department’s independence,30 reforms
that are (in updated form) still in place to this day.31 These protocols, for
example, require White House staff to communicate with the DOJ about
particular investigations and prosecutions strictly through the White House
Counsel’s office, rather than by contacting individual employees of the
DOJ.32
Decades earlier, Edward Levi and Griffin Bell understood that politicization on the part of government lawyers is particularly damaging.33 A
series of irresponsible and misleading memos emanated from the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) in 2002 and 2003—memos that sought to justify the
CIA-led abusive interrogation of detainees using methods amounting to torture.34 Some of these memos were subsequently withdrawn,35 but not before
the credibility of both the CIA and the DOJ had been badly damaged.
Other examples of politicization have unfortunately damaged the department over the years and compromised its commitment to the rule of
law. In 2006, for example, several U.S. attorneys were fired, at least one
upon the urging of a senator.36 The apparent reason for the firings was that
the DOJ had refused to conduct criminal investigations having to do with
alleged voter fraud.37 Attorney General Alberto Gonzales in 2007 resigned
after giving testimony about the U.S. attorney firings—testimony that some
members of Congress found to be misleading.38 Years earlier in March 1993,
President Clinton fired all of the U.S. attorneys from the George H. W. Bush
administration, a move that was also perceived as highly political.39 In the
Obama administration, results-oriented reasoning was once again on display in the DOJ in the form of a controversial memo issued by OLC on the
authorization to use military force in Libya. 40 Similarly, in the domain of
war powers, the 2010 Obama-era OLC memo authorizing the targeted killing in Yemen of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen, has been regarded
as highly problematic as well, given that Yemen is a sovereign nation with
which the United States was not at war and given the memo’s somewhat
distorted treatment of the concept of “imminence” under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). 41
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These earlier instances of politicization at the DOJ under presidents of
both parties, and the failure to correct these excesses, set the stage for what
was to come. During the Trump administration, politicized use of the department’s powers was more the norm than the exception in cases where
President Trump’s interests were affected. Under Barr’s leadership, for
example, there was a striking use of the department’s prosecutorial function apparently to punish political enemies and to buy the cooperation of
potential friends. There was political interference in DOJ criminal investigations and prosecutions, such as that on display in the Roger Stone and
Michael Flynn cases. 42 There was also evident vindictiveness against those
who spoke out against the administration or Donald Trump, like that unleashed on the president’s former lawyer, Michael Cohen, who was reimprisoned before the publication of his book about Donald Trump, following his
release from prison on a medical furlough. A judge promptly and properly
ordered the government to re-release him. 43
The public also now knows that during the Trump years, the department
secretly obtained phone records of journalists, seeking to find the source of
leaks to the press about the Russia investigation. 44 Except under the most
extraordinary circumstances, DOJ surveillance of journalists is a violation
of the First Amendment freedom of the press and should not be countenanced. In this case, President Trump’s loudly proclaimed concerns about
leaks in the Russia investigation were politically motivated, and there was
no national security justification for targeting journalists. Trump’s attacks
on journalists, which began on day one of his presidency and continued
throughout his time in office, were aimed at blunting criticism of his own
conduct by calling any unflattering portraits he received in the media “fake
news.” His public attacks, as well as the DOJ’s clandestine investigations
of legitimate journalistic activities, were offensive and damaging to democratic values.
The department similarly targeted Democratic members of Congress
as well as their aides and members of their families, including at least one
minor. DOJ accomplished this by secretly obtaining the family members’
phone records and other metadata by subpoena from Apple. Among those
targeted in this way were members of the House Intelligence Committee
that was investigating the 2016 Trump campaign’s ties to Russia, including
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Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA), then the committee’s ranking member,
and Representative Eric Swalwell (D-C A). The subpoenas also involved a
gag order that made it impossible for Apple to speak out against these incursions. 45 In 2018 the DOJ also sent a subpoena to Apple to seize the phone
records of former White House Counsel Don McGahn while he was still in
office. 46 The foregoing privacy violations were an abuse of legitimate law enforcement investigatory powers as well as a direct affront to the separation
of powers contemplated by the Constitution. Members of Congress have the
constitutional right and duty to conduct oversight of executive branch functions without themselves being surveilled by that very branch. Such conduct
by the nation’s chief law enforcement agency is antithetical to the principles
of representative democracy.
Other politicized actions in DOJ included unjustified criminal
investigations, 47 allegedly politically motivated targeting of companies in
antitrust enforcement, 48 using federal offices to influence elections in violation of the Hatch Act, 49 and allegedly unauthorized use of force against protestors and others exercising their First Amendment rights.50 Many of these
actions appeared to violate DOJ policy or federal law. Under Attorney General Barr, for example, the DOJ sought to justify the president’s attempts to
solicit the assistance of foreign countries with his bid for reelection, such as
the infamous call to the president of Ukraine in 2019, for which Trump was
impeached, though not removed.51 This kind of interference compromised
U.S. relationships with key allies abroad and placed a personal, domestic
political agenda ahead of U.S. national security.
Decades earlier, Edward Levi and Griffin Bell understood the damage
that politicization on the part of government lawyers would particularly inflict on OLC in the undermining of democratic values. When the OLC uses
the law as a political tool to achieve partisan aims, particularly if it distorts
the law for this purpose, its conduct profoundly undermines the rule of law.
This is because using the trappings and language of law to justify violating the law damages the very concept of legality itself.52 In particular, the
willingness of OLC in the Bush years to distort the law to justify the use of
torture contributed to the distrust of OLC’s opinions and has conveyed the
sense that OLC is primarily oriented toward providing legal cover for White
House policies. Results-oriented reasoning masquerading as genuine legal
advice resurfaced in Donald Trump’s DOJ under the leadership of William
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Barr. Barr too often seemed to regard himself as the president’s personal
lawyer rather than the head of a federal agency committed to enforcing the
law.
Damage to the rule of law can be accomplished in an instant, but repair
takes time. It will take much work and focused attention to repair the
damage from the politicization of the DOJ’s central functions—work that
must be undertaken function by function within the DOJ. Politicization of
the DOJ strikes not only at the foundations of democratic governance at
home, but also damages U.S. national security interests in the domain of
foreign relations. The CERL/CREW working group found that, in several
different areas, “the actions of the DOJ under Mr. Barr compromised U.S.
national security and increased risks to U.S. national interests relative to
foreign and domestic enemies.”53 OLC memos like the one defending the
2020 strike on Iranian state actor Qassim Suleimani damage the rule of
law by casting doubt on fundamental principles relating domestic law to
the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).54 Such distortions of law impact national security for the worse. The working group found the risk to national
security from the department’s actions to be particularly concerning under
Barr’s leadership, and found that Barr was “more interested in supporting
the president’s reelection bid” than in protecting U.S. security priorities or
upholding the law.55 The risk he posed to national security went well beyond
the politicization of OLC memos relating to the law of war, given the role
Barr may have played in the aforementioned Ukraine matter. The risk of
collusion between a runaway president or attorney general and a malign
foreign power is significant, and in retrospect it may seem surprising that
it has not occurred more frequently. Particular attention must be paid to
ensure that the attorney general does not damage U.S. national security
interests under pressure from a corrupt president, and to guard against
the possibility of collusion between executive branch officials and foreign
powers.
Restoring commitment to the rule of law will not be an easy task, particularly in light of the erosion of the norms and practices that have served as
informal guardrails for U.S. democracy. In an ideal world, legal constraints
provide the outlines of what democracy requires, while a shared commitment to democratic values allows citizens to trust that those outlines will
be filled in with integrity. In the absence of shared values, the survival of
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democracy will depend on the country’s ability to replace informal norms
with formal rules and laws, such as those we detail in this chapter. While it
would be a mistake to think the United States can restore and secure those
traditions by legislating them back into existence, the country must nevertheless attempt the task of codifying as many of the guardrails of democracy
as will lend themselves to such an exercise.
New rules alone, however, cannot repair the many different forms of
damage to the rule of law from acts of the past. Indeed, in many instances
there were optimal rules in place, but those rules were violated with impunity. In the next section, we discuss another important aspect of restoring
integrity and repairing damage to the rule of law, namely the role of accountability and the need to address legal violations, particularly those that
occur within the DOJ.

Violations and Accountability in Prior Administrations

Preserving and restoring the rule of law in a democracy requires accountability for past misdeeds, particular for those of government actors.
Accountability requires the country to confront and address illegal and immoral conduct on the part of various U.S. institutions that has occurred in
the past.56 Without transparency about the past and accountability of government for its actions, future administrations are likely to repeat former
mistakes.
Setting the scene for the excesses of the Trump era, formal legal condemnation of senior officials in prior administrations in the United States
has been rare, and most criminal activity by government officials remains
unaddressed. Exceptions have included several Watergate defendants57
(though President Nixon himself evaded accountability by receiving a
pardon from President Ford), as well as several senior officials from the
Reagan administration who were involved in the Iran-Contra scandal, most
of whom were pardoned by President George H.W. Bush in 1992. Federal
prosecutors are concerned about appearing to be political and often do not
like to prosecute officials from a previous administration. With respect to
allegations of international wrongdoing, the disdain of the United States for
international mechanisms of accountability has undermined its ability to
serve as a standard-bearer for the rule of law across the globe. For example,
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the refusal of the United States to ratify the Rome Statute establishing the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) weakens the ability
of the international community to hold senior officials, including U.S. officials, accountable for serious crimes.58 In general, the United States has
not looked favorably on attempts to hold U.S. officials accountable, even in
instances of clearly illegal conduct.59
Following this pattern, the Obama administration made the decision
in 2009 not to investigate or prosecute officials from the George W. Bush
administration who had been involved with the use of torture in the war on
terror.60 Upon assuming office in 2009, President Obama said that “we need
to look forward as opposed to looking backwards.”61 Subsequently, detailed
findings were released by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(SSCI) documenting a high-level, CIA-d riven program to engage in the
torture and mistreatment of numerous detainees captured in Iraq and Afghanistan, which also attracted the support of other sectors of government,
including the DOJ.62 Contemporaneous with the release of the SSCI report,
Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the department would not
prosecute anyone following the mistaken and distorted OLC memos justifying the use of torture.63 As a result, there have been no prosecutions of any
of the architects or high-level participants in the Rendition, Detention, and
Interrogation (RDI) program, and very few prosecutions of anyone who actually carried out the torture either. That is despite powerful evidence that
the use of waterboarding and other harsh interrogation methods constituted torture, in violation of both U.S. federal law and U.S. treaty obligations
under the Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention against Torture,
as well as the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).64 Other countries
have been at least superficially more willing to self-examine around this
issue. The U.K., for example, authorized an investigation into crimes that
were carried out by British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,65 but ultimately
the vast majority of the charges were dropped due to lack of evidence.66
While the SSCI report laid the greatest responsibility for the use of illegal methods of interrogation at the doorstep of the CIA, it is hard to overstate the role played by DOJ lawyers at the Office of Legal Counsel who
knowingly provided the CIA and the Department of Defense (DOD) with
the incorrect legal advice that so-called enhanced interrogation was legal
and could be used on detainees in the war on terror.67 Given that the Holder
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Justice Department argued for immunity on the part of those who inflicted
the torture because they were relying on the OLC memos,68 one might have
thought that would serve as a basis for finding those who falsely designed
that justification responsible. Yet, Holder offered no explanation for why the
authors of the memos were never investigated by the DOJ for their role in
creating false legal advice that hundreds in the White House, the CIA, and
the armed services would rely on to ensure the legality of their actions.
Moreover, the idea that those who relied on the OLC memos had a clear
basis for exoneration was incorrect. The truth is considerably more complicated. The “just following the OLC memos” defense should not, in theory,
be any more effective for deflecting responsibility than the “just following
orders” defense was at Nuremberg.69 No such defense can be claimed where
the individual making the claim knew that the action was illegal, or where an
actor knew that the proposed illegal act would be unable to meet its military
or civilian objective. The rule against torture under international law is jus
cogens, meaning that everyone is expected to know the law.70 In the United
States, public servants, including the military and members of the CIA, take
an oath to defend and uphold the Constitution. That oath imposes a duty to
refuse to follow a patently illegal order and to report illegality up the chain
of command. Those who followed the memos could try to argue an “advice
of counsel” defense, comparable to the “just following orders” defense. Yet,
once again, neither defense should immunize someone who authorizes or
engages in torture where the conduct in question is patently illegal and the
individual knows, or has reason to know, that this is so.
Why, then, did President Obama so willingly embrace the no-
accountability approach, when it flew in the face of both the Nuremberg
tradition and the clear approach to illegal orders demanded by U.S. constitutional jurisprudence? There have been many rationalizations offered for the
decision not to prosecute those involved in the RDI program, but they fall
flat when one considers the conspiracy of silence that has surrounded even
less formal means for sanctioning those who designed and implemented that
program. Almost without exception, those who were most supportive of the
use of torture were promoted and found further positions in government,
academia, or think tanks. Jay Bybee, the former head of OLC, became a federal judge in 2003.71 John Yoo returned to legal academia as a chaired professor at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law,72 and his history
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at OLC did not prevent the Heritage Foundation,73 the National Constitution
Center,74 the American Enterprise Institute,75 and the Federalist Society from
embracing him as a fellow or for regular talks and engagements.
Gina Haspel, who served as director of the CIA under Trump, not only
allegedly assisted in implementing the use of torture at a CIA so-called
“black site” in Thailand during the Bush administration. As chief of staff
to Jose Rodriguez, head of the CIA’s clandestine service, she also issued the
order in November 2005 for the destruction of videotapes of torture sessions, some of which took place under her watch.76 The White House counsel
in 2005 had been informed of the destruction of the tapes, supposedly after
the fact, and expressed grave concern, but no investigation ensued.77 In an
eight-page memo, then CIA deputy director Mike Morell exonerated Haspel
for her role in destroying these tapes during the Bush administration,78 but
there appears to be no other comprehensive report on this matter.79 For her
commitment to the program and her willingness to protect other members
of the CIA, Haspel was held in high regard by members of the intelligence
community, support that helped her bid to secure Donald Trump’s nomination and Senate confirmation as director of the CIA.80 Despite the controversy, Haspel was confirmed 54-45, with several key Democrats joining
Republicans to support her.81
Moreover, while there have been significant investigations into the Rendition, Detention, and Investigation program, some of the resulting reports,
such as U.S. Attorney John Durham’s 2012 report for DOJ on torture and the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) report, have not been fully
declassified.82 Only 500 or so pages of the executive summary, out of more
than 6,700 pages of the SSCI report, have been released, despite repeated requests by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), who chaired the committee, for
greater public disclosure.83 The failure to produce the full, unredacted text
of the SSCI report stands in stark contrast with the treatment of an earlier
Senate Armed Services Committee report, which was released in 2009.84
The secrecy surrounding the CIA’s role, along with information that continues to dribble out in connection with the military commissions, means that
the country cannot fully put its past use of torture to rest.85 President Biden
should declassify the remaining documents relating to the RDI program so
Congress and the public can have full transparency and ensure that it never
happens again. He should also put an end to the continued abuse and mis-
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carriage of justice of the remaining detainees at Guantanamo Bay by closing
the prison and either trying the remaining detainees in federal court or repatriating them to their home countries, as would be required for those with
prisoner of war (POW) status by the Geneva Conventions.86
Most importantly for present purposes, any reform of the DOJ will require a thorough examination of its Office of Legal Counsel, for which an
investigation of the role its lawyers played in greenlighting the use of torture
will be essential. While the Senate examined the role of the armed services
and that of the CIA in the use of torture and did hold one hearing regarding
the role of the DOJ in approving and coordinating the use of torture,87 there
is no report from either the House or the Senate Judiciary Committees on
the OLC torture memos. That unwritten chapter in U.S. history continues
to damage faith in the DOJ, particularly in its OLC, and creates continuing
doubt about the legality and legitimacy of OLC legal advice.
From the standpoint of the rule of law, this failure of accountability is
profoundly corrosive. The decision to “look forward, not back” on torture,
and the legal precedent that was therefore never fully excised and rejected
by the U.S. legal system, damaged the country’s ability to hold government
officials to the constraints of law. It also had a damaging effect on U.S. respect for the LOAC and on the very concept of the rule of law itself.88 As
such, lack of accountability badly discredited the OLC and weakened the
normative authority of its legal opinions. 89 It also created deep mistrust
of the intelligence community, particularly the CIA. Damage from both
sources arguably made itself felt in the Trump administration, which might
have been held more in check had abuses of executive authority been reined
in by the DOJ at an earlier point in time.90
The failure to hold prior administrations accountable recurred in the
transition from the Trump to the Biden administration. The Biden DOJ, for
example, has thus far failed to announce any investigation into the potential crimes of Donald Trump or his administration, including in connection with the former president’s role in inciting the attack on the Capitol on
January 6, 2021. However, the House of Representatives has engaged in a
robust investigation of this incident, which has included issuing subpoenas
to former members of President Trump’s inner circle, and the DOJ has announced that it will not honor Trump’s assertion of executive privilege to
block the enforcement of such subpoenas.91
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In other matters, however, Attorney General Merrick Garland has filed
a flurry of motions and other papers siding with former President Trump in
important cases implicating his interests. The DOJ has appealed a federal
judge’s order that a secret 2019 DOJ memo discussing possible indictment
of President Trump be released under the Freedom of Information Act.92 It
has also asserted executive privilege over the congressional testimony of
former White House Counsel Don McGahn93 in response to a House subpoena, although it ultimately settled the matter and allowed a deposition to
proceed, albeit with significant constraints.94 The Biden DOJ has also sided
with Trump in urging dismissal of a suit by Black Lives Matter and other
plaintiffs over the violent clearing of peaceful protestors from Lafayette
Park in 2020 to facilitate a Trump campaign photo op.95 And the department has filed briefs with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals siding with
Trump in his appeal of a federal district court decision refusing to dismiss E.
Jean Carroll’s federal defamation suit against him.96 The DOJ continues to
take the position that Trump’s statements about Carroll—who had accused
Trump of a rape that took place in New York City twenty years ago—were
issued in his “official” capacity. The current DOJ is maintaining that stance
even though Trump called her a liar about events that had nothing to do
with his presidency (and then for good measure added that Carroll was “not
my type”).97
Fortunately, DOJ did not apply this same logic to a lawsuit against a
member of Congress, Representative Mo Brooks (R-A L), who was sued by
Representative Eric Swalwell (D-CA) over Brooks’s incendiary speech near
the White House shortly before the January 6 insurrection on the Capitol.
Brooks repeated unfounded allegations of election fraud and urged supporters to “start taking down names and kicking ass.” Brooks claimed that his
statements were, like Trump’s against Carroll, made in his official capacity
and that the DOJ was obligated, under the Westfall Act, to defend him as
well. The DOJ rejected this argument, determining that Brooks’s statements
were personal capacity “campaign activity” and declined to defend him.98 It
remains to be seen whether the DOJ would take the same stance in a civil
lawsuit over the events of January 6 against former President Trump.
Which way will the DOJ ultimately go on Trump and his administration?
The attorney general has the discretion to determine DOJ policy. However,
the DOJ’s stance in some of these cases also shows an alarming degree of
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deference to presidential power, an orientation that has been fairly consistently maintained by different attorneys general for a number of years. What
is particularly concerning about the deference shown to presidential power
in these various contexts is that the broad scope of executive authority becomes a tool on the part of the president and other executive branch officials
for avoiding accountability, and even for obstructing justice by interfering
with legitimate investigations. Efforts to investigate and, ultimately, to hold
executive branch officials accountable must be protected against manipulation. Even the appointment of a special counsel by the attorney general
cannot adequately protect against presidential interference with attempts
to establish responsibility and transparency, as shown, for instance, by the
outcome of the Mueller investigation. That is particularly the case in the
absence of the appointment of a special counsel to investigate the potential
crimes of past administrations and the unwillingness at times on the part
of the Garland DOJ to hold prior executive branch officials accountable for
illegal acts of the past.
If crimes were committed by the government, even by the president
himself, the architects of those crimes should be investigated and, if the evidence warrants, prosecuted. The decision whether to prosecute former government officials is a complex one, but it is best depoliticized by having the
determination made by an independent counsel whose mandate allows him
or her to operate substantially independently of the DOJ’s current leadership. Had the Obama administration chosen to provide the American people
with a full accounting of the illegalities of the previous administration, and
had Obama chosen to prosecute the most significant architects of the RDI
program, it would have traveled some distance toward reversing and repairing the distortion of law the administration inherited from the war on
terror. Undoing legal distortions and clearly identifying and repudiating the
mistakes of the past might have helped to prevent the politicization of the
DOJ during the Trump administration.
Whether there is any cause and effect between the prior failures of accountability and the subsequent more wholesale dismantlement of integrity
at the DOJ is a matter of speculation. But in an atmosphere in which the
department has become increasingly politicized, the way was paved for further and deepening abuse of the powers of the DOJ to satisfy the political
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ambitions of the current occupant of the Oval Office. Clarifying the role of
the DOJ, along with enhanced transparency, accountability, and apologies
for the mistakes of the past, would go some way toward reestablishing the
faith once placed in the department by the American people.

Presidential Obstruction of Justice

In numerous instances, Donald Trump attempted to interfere with independent investigations of the 2016 Trump campaign, along with other potential
matters of criminal interest. For example, it emerged in the course of the
Mueller investigation that Trump had indeed asked White House Counsel
Don McGahn to have Robert Mueller fired, and that McGahn had refused to
comply.99 Instead, Trump ultimately fired his attorney general, Jeff Sessions,
and installed William Barr in his place to supervise Mueller and the rollout
of the special counsel’s report.
The special counsel’s report describes the holes in the evidence his team
gathered from witnesses who lied or withheld information, and President
Trump refused to be interviewed in person by the Mueller team.100 Once
Mueller submitted his final report to Barr, the attorney general purported
to characterize the special counsel’s principal findings in a March 24, 2019,
letter to the chairs and ranking members of the Senate and House Judiciary
Committees.101 But the inaccuracy of this letter led Mueller to respond with
his own letter to Barr about the “public confusion about critical aspects of
the results” that the attorney general’s letter had generated.102 Two federal
judges have since sharply criticized Barr’s “lack of candor” in his handling
of the Mueller report. Judge Reggie Walton stated that Barr provided a “distorted” and “misleading” account of the report to the American people,
which led the judge to question Barr’s “credibility” and, with it, the department’s representation of the report to the judge.103 One year later, Judge Amy
Berman Jackson echoed Judge Walton’s opinion, writing that Barr and the
Justice Department were “disingenuous” and that DOJ’s descriptions of an
OLC memorandum drafted to lend an air of legitimacy to Barr’s preformed
views on obstruction of justice “are so inconsistent with evidence in the
record, they are not worthy of credence.”104
In volume II of his report, Mueller indicated he could not indict President
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Trump because the DOJ has a policy against indicting a sitting president.105
What transpired next—including Barr’s noted misrepresentation of the
Mueller report’s findings to Congress—is a clear indication that the DOJ’s
current special counsel regulations and related policies fail to protect the
independence and transparency of an investigation involving the president.
As we explain more fully in a forthcoming article,106 the DOJ policy against
indicting a sitting president is not mandated by the Constitution. That point
became even more obvious when the Supreme Court ruled in Trump v. Vance
that a sitting president is subject to criminal process, including a state grand
jury subpoena.107 Mueller nonetheless had no choice; his boss, Attorney General William Barr, was not going to authorize indictment of the president.
After President Trump left office, however, indictment became a realistic
option.108 Indeed, the Mueller report contemplates just that post-presidency
possibility when discussing the importance of preserving the evidence and
documenting what President Trump and others did. The importance of preserving and documenting the evidence was one of the justifications in the
report for the detail in volume II on obstruction of justice.
This chapter does not fully explore the merits of Mueller’s obstruction
of justice case against President Trump, as this is already the subject of considerable analysis.109 Much of the argument for finding Trump responsible
for obstructing justice is built around specific actions he took in connection
with the Russia investigation—such as firing FBI Director James Comey
and attempting to fire Mueller himself—all actions intended to impede the
investigation and violate the obstruction of justice statutes.110 As a private
sector lawyer in 2018 before his second term as attorney general, William
Barr had laid out a detailed argument in a letter to President Trump explaining his belief that Mueller’s “obstruction theory” was wrong and why the
supposed acts of obstruction were actually within the president’s powers
under Article II of the Constitution.111 This self-serving memorandum apparently helped induce Trump to nominate Barr as attorney general. However, we believe that Mueller was right on the question of obstruction and
that Barr was clearly wrong: Article II does not empower the president to
obstruct justice, a point later underscored in 2020 by the Supreme Court’s
clear message in Trump v. Vance that nothing in Article II of the Constitution exempts the president from criminal process.
A second category of rule of law violation in past administrations in-
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volves conduct where the executive branch has exceeded its authority, but
where the action is not necessarily criminal. Alternatively, this could be categorized as conduct that is illegal but that for various reasons has become
unprosecutable, such as because the statute of limitations has run out or
there is a general grant of immunity against prosecution.112 True accountability would address this conduct in addition to conduct that is identifiably
illegal and prosecutable. The unavailability of prosecution should not be
taken to mean there are no resources to remedy the past. In such instances,
the DOJ or other executive branch agencies must seek to establish accountability, coupled with transparency, along alternative lines.
The emphasis here is more on institutional accountability than on individual accountability, yet both are important. Governments can only act
through individuals who serve as their agents, and thus any focus on crimes
of government must also hold individuals responsible. Yet there is a great
difference between accepting institutional responsibility for past failings
and blaming institutional wrongdoing on individual agents, which sometimes only serves to deflect from true public accountability. The use of torture under the Bush administration, the excessive and possibly illegal use
of drone strikes under the Obama administration, and the inhumane treatment of immigrants in detention facilities during the Trump administration all raised serious questions about expanding presidential war powers
and executive authority more generally, as well as the ability of the other
branches of the federal government to ensure that the executive branch adheres to the rule of law.113

Alternate Forms of Accountability

Criminal investigation and prosecution of current or former senior governmental leaders who violate the law is one of the most important means of establishing responsibility and repairing damage to the rule of law. Often the
opposite occurs: low-level government employees who carry out the policies
of their leaders are prosecuted while the architects walk free. Accountability
requires particularly that we identify the crimes of senior government leaders, as it helps to establish the systematic nature of the wrongdoing and the
fact that it was part of a concerted plan on the part of the state to violate
the law. However, when individual prosecution of senior leaders is legally or
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politically infeasible, we may still be able to hold government accountable,
as well as to make significant progress toward repairing damage to the rule
of law.
There are a number of ways for a government to acknowledge responsibility without conducting criminal prosecutions. For example, Japanese
Americans who had been incarcerated in internment camps during World
War II under a 1942 presidential executive order were partially and belatedly compensated for lost property beginning in the Truman administration, pursuant to the Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act of 1948.114
This statute merely compensated for seized and lost property, refusing to
acknowledge that the United States government had done anything wrong,
a point already made by the Supreme Court in 1944 in Korematsu v. United
States, when it upheld the constitutionality of the executive order.115 A Supreme Court majority did not revisit the erroneous decision upholding the
executive order until seventy-four years later, in dicta rejecting the reasoning of Korematsu, but in an opinion where the court nonetheless refused to
strike down another executive order of dubious constitutionality, this one
by President Trump banning entry to the United States of people from a
group of principally Muslim countries.116 Hopefully in future cases, it will
take less than seventy-four years to complete the process of acknowledging
that the United States government was legally as well as morally wrong, a
process that in this instance was only completed in 2018 when the Supreme
Court may very well have blindly given its approval to yet another wrong.
Most victims of torture after 9/11 thus far have not received com
pensation,117 and some of them remain in Guantanamo indefinitely without
charge or awaiting a trial that may never come. Under the UN Convention
against Torture, victims of torture are entitled to “redress and . . . an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation.”118 The DOJ should work
accordingly with the legal advisor to the State Department to (1) determine the extent of the U.S. obligation under the circumstances of the war
on terror to pay reparations and (2) make a good-faith effort to address its
own liability in advance of potential litigation in international courts.119 This
would be a particularly important move to make in light of President Biden’s
decision to end the war in Afghanistan by withdrawing all U.S. troops,
coupled with his insistence that American involvement in hostilities in the
region has ceased.120
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Some victims of rule of law breaches by the Trump administration—
including children who were illegally separated from their parents and were
held in deeply inhumane conditions—also should receive compensation for
their suffering. First, there is the importance of wholly or at least partially
compensating the victim of illegal federal government conduct for violation
of rights as one would compensate the victim of any tort, particularly an
intentional tort. Of equal importance is the message to the public and to
future administrations that certain actions by the federal government are
illegal, and that if injury results therefrom, these actions are tortious and
must be compensated. Once required to publicly acknowledge fault and to
pay compensation for illegal actions, the government is less likely to perform these or similar actions again.
In addition to compensation, there is often enhanced accountability in
mere transparency itself. Even many years after the injury occurred, a full
and unequivocal acknowledgement of the wrongs that were inflicted can
help to heal some of the wounds for the victims and also contribute to enhanced accountability on the part of government actors, even if no penalty
is paid other than in the court of public opinion. Commissions established
for truth and reconciliation in South Africa following apartheid, for example, were designed with precisely this function in view, though their success
has been debated.121 Japan agreed to apologize as well as to pay $8.3 million
in compensation to Korean women who had been forced into sexual slavery
during the Second World War,122 though the final resolution of the matter
between the two nations has remained elusive.123 And in 2013, an association
of Chilean judges issued an apology for the court system’s role in the human
rights abuses committed during the regime of dictator Augusto Pinochet.124
While apologies or compensation offered many years after the initial
fact may seem pointless, especially if paid to a succeeding generation from
that which was originally wronged, there is a forward-looking purpose to
symbolic acts of this sort. Apologies or even relatively modest monetary
awards serve an expressive function: they acknowledge that a wrong was
committed and identify a need not to repeat the conduct again. This is as
important for clarifying the culpability of the government as it is for helping
victims move past the injury. It constitutes a clear commitment to a different path in the future and to different values from the ones manifested in
the wrongful act. That this has failed to occur in the case of the illegal meth-
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ods of interrogation that occurred at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons,
among other U.S.-r un bases and black sites, may explain the lack of reprobation and the continued personal success of Bush administration officials
who had a role in furthering the torture program.

The Advisory Function of the DOJ

Revisiting illegal conduct of previous administrations requires introspection and accountability within the DOJ itself. Much of the conduct that appeared to be contrary to law during the Trump administration occurred
inside the DOJ or was approved by the department. This conduct included
the DOJ’s role in approving and then defending in the courts some of the
executive orders and other administrative actions discussed above. DOJ
lawyers, mostly political appointees of the president, and their subordinates
were intimately involved in many of these activities. Among other forms of
accountability, the DOJ’s inspector general and Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) should investigate this conduct and report on whether
policy or legal violations occurred. Persons found to have violated the law
or engaged in other serious misconduct in most instances should be barred
from federal employment in the future rather than rewarded for being stalwart in defending their former colleagues in the face of political pressure to
come clean.125 Referrals should also be made to state bar disciplinary committees.
In addition to investigations of culpable individuals, the DOJ should
conduct a review of legally questionable actions in previous administrations to guide the present and future administrations. A written evaluation
of the legality of questionable government conduct is needed even if such
conduct is not presently under consideration. If prior conduct is illegal, the
DOJ should be on record indicating as much. Only in this way can the DOJ
learn from the mistakes of the past and improve the legal consistency of the
department over time.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4036891

Restoring the Rule of Law through Department of Justice Reform

143

Recommendations for Restoring the Rule of Law at DOJ

The CERL/CREW report, released in October 2020, included specific recommendations as to how to restore the independence of the DOJ from partisan politics and assure the department’s commitment to the rule of law.126
As coauthors of the CERL/CREW report, we incorporate those recommendations here, in some cases expanding upon the discussion in the original
CERL/CREW document.
Reform efforts involving the DOJ are most likely to be implemented in
one of three ways: a change in DOJ policy; an executive order (EO) by the
president; or congressional action, specifically legislation. Many of the post-
Watergate reforms to the DOJ were implemented by changes to DOJ policies and procedures under Attorney General Edward Levi and his successor,
Griffin Bell. As noted above, such reforms are vulnerable because they can
be easily reversed by subsequent attorneys general.
An EO, on the other hand, needs to be rescinded by a president, forcing
future presidents to accept political accountability for the change. An EO
can also give agencies outside the DOJ, such as the Office of Government
Ethics (OGE) or the Office of Special Counsel (OSC), a role in monitoring
and reporting to the president and to Congress about what is happening
within the DOJ. From the standpoint of strengthening the ethical and legal
core of the DOJ’s conduct, this arrangement is preferable to one in which
the attorney general has exclusive control over the department’s compliance
with its own rules.
Finally, the most permanent changes to DOJ policies and procedures
can be accomplished by statute, which can only be reversed by an act of Congress. Because of concerns about abuse of presidential power,127 legislative
reforms are preferable whenever possible. Although ethics reform by statute
can be politically fraught, this may be the right moment. The White House
is currently controlled by a political party that has complained about abuses
at the DOJ under the previous administration.128 The other party, having
lost the White House, may have a renewed interest in restraining the power
of the executive branch, including the DOJ. However, passing legislation
takes time, and therefore an executive order from the president may be the
most effective means to implement these recommendations in a sufficiently
timely manner until statutory reform becomes possible. Meanwhile, and de-
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spite some policy differences we have with the current attorney general, we
have full confidence that Merrick Garland will informally do everything in
his power to reduce the overall atmosphere of politicization of the department while more lasting reforms are being established.
Recommendations for further structural changes are set out in the discussion that follows.

Strengthen the Independence of the Special Counsel

Currently, special counsels must be appointed by the attorney general or
the acting attorney general, and authorization for such an appointment lies
solely within the executive branch. This was not always the case, however.
After Watergate, Congress passed legislation authorizing the appointment
of an independent counsel, but Congress allowed the law to lapse in 1999.129
To protect the independence of this critical role, Congress should renew the
special prosecutor legislation, with particular attention to the need to ensure
the independence of that office. In particular, in the absence of congressional action to establish an independent prosecutor, those investigating the
president or other high-level officials will be continuously vulnerable to dismissal, which will allow the president to exercise considerable control over
any investigation into her or his own potential wrongdoing or wrongdoing of
persons close to the president. Independent prosecutors must be protected
against arbitrary dismissal. No federal prosecutor or investigator—whether
an independent counsel, an inspector general, or a U.S. attorney 130 —should
be fired by a superior if the motivation for the firing is to stop or obstruct an
investigation of alleged criminal activity. The power to hire and fire in the
federal government should not include the power to obstruct justice.
There are two main arguments against the passage of an independent
counsel law: (1) that it is unconstitutional and (2) that its prior iterations led
to gross prosecutorial overreach. Both fail on close examination.
First, there are those who believe that restricting the power of the president to remove an independent prosecutor would be unconstitutional. In
1988, the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson131 upheld the independent
counsel statute against arguments that it unconstitutionally infringed on
the power of the executive. In the face of objections that the independent
counsel statute infringed on the power of the president, the Court said:
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This case does not involve an attempt by Congress itself to gain a role
in the removal of executive officials other than its established powers of
impeachment and conviction. The Act instead puts the removal power
squarely in the hands of the Executive Branch; an independent counsel
may be removed from office “only by the personal action of the Attorney
General, and only for good cause.”132
One justice, Antonin Scalia, issued a famous dissent in which he complained that the majority opinion violated the framers’ intent with regard to
the separation of powers and also unduly weakened the executive branch:
This is what this suit is about. Power. The allocation of power among
Congress, the President, and the courts in such fashion as to preserve
the equilibrium the Constitution sought to establish—so that “a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department,” can effectively be resisted. Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the
Court clad, so to speak, in sheep’s clothing: the potential of the asserted
principle to effect important change in the equilibrium of power is not
immediately evident, and must be discerned by a careful and perceptive
analysis. But this wolf comes as a wolf.133
Scalia and other critics of that decision point to Myers v. United States
(1926), which established the president’s right to remove members of the executive branch as a broader removal power than Morrison would suggest.134
Indeed, the Myers case defends a theory of presidential power known as the
“unitary executive theory,” which interprets the president’s power to remove
executive branch officials under Article II as nearly absolute, and thus if the
president wants to fire a member of the executive branch, no ordinary legislation can stop him or her. Adherents of the unitary executive theory maintain
that Trump had the right to fire Robert Mueller, even if he had done so explicitly to put an end to the investigation into himself and his 2016 campaign.
The same could be said under this theory of Trump’s firing of FBI Director
Jim Comey, despite the fact that Trump explicitly admitted after he fired
Comey that he “faced great pressure” because of the Russia inquiry.135
We reject this expansive view of presidential removal power and do not
believe that Myers can be understood as extending presidential removal in
cases involving obstruction of justice. Indeed, Myers held that Congress
could not restrict the president’s power to remove a postmaster, but this is
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quite a far cry from removing a prosecutor in the middle of an ongoing investigation of the president or of persons close to the president. Contrary to
what Scalia may have thought, Myers should not be read as suggesting that
the president’s removal power is in fact unlimited, especially when that case
is read in conjunction with Morrison. Although Myers does recognize “a legislative declaration that the power to remove officers appointed by the President and the Senate vested in the President alone,”136 the court in that case
was addressing the narrower question of whether the fact that the Senate
must approve appointments gave it the implied power of being able to exercise a veto over removals. Myers laid to rest the idea that the Senate might
exercise such a veto, but it failed to address whether Article II constrains
Congress’s ability to limit the president’s removal powers.
A further development in this line of cases was the court’s decision
in Humphry’s Executor v. United States,137 in which the court refined Myers
to suggest that congressional control over executive appointments might
differ depending on the agency involved. Thus the court found that Myers
did not apply to Congress’s ability to limit the president’s power to remove
a member of the Federal Trade Commission,138 similar to its ruling in Morrison. In another case, however, the court distinguished the two cases and
struck down statutory restrictions on the president’s power to remove officers from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) in
Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,139 as well as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB.140 While this area of law is
somewhat in flux, Morrison is still good law, and there is no current legal
impediment to reenacting the special counsel law in some form. In particular, the existence of an independent counsel who is subject to dismissal only
for cause is fully consistent with broad presidential authority under Article
II,141 and the same might be said for an independent counsel appointed by
the attorney general in the absence of special counsel legislation.
Second, bringing back the independent counsel law is controversial
among some who otherwise are strong supporters of presidential accountability because of concern about an overzealous independent counsel free
of supervision by the attorney general. For example, Bob Bauer and Jack
Goldsmith in their 2020 book rejected the idea of bringing back an independent counsel statute and advocated that the DOJ should retain a check
on the special prosecutor.142 A 1999 joint report of the American Enterprise
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Institute (AEI) and the Brookings Institution also concluded that the attorney general’s responsibilities for appointing a special counsel should be fully
restored.143 As the 1999 AEI-Brookings report observed:
Like many, we believe the Act’s reach has been too broad and too arbitrary. Instead of promoting public confidence, the Act has failed to produce public consensus that outside counsel are being appointed when,
but only when, it is in the public interest that a matter be removed from
the Department of Justice’s jurisdiction.144
The report recommended an arrangement similar to what the United
States has had for the past twenty years—namely, that the attorney general
once again have the power to make decisions concerning the scope of the
independent counsel’s jurisdiction, the budget of the special counsel, measures to make sure that the independent counsel is both independent and
conforms to Justice Department policies and procedures, and whether to
remove the independent counsel for cause.
This concern about runaway independent prosecutors was fueled in particular by two lengthy investigations by special counsels: the Iran-Contra
investigation by independent counsel Lawrence Walsh, and Ken Starr’s investigation of President Clinton. Following these inquiries, worry about the
unchecked power of independent counsel was paramount, and removing
the federal judiciary from its role in appointing and supervising the independent counsel and restoring the authority of the attorney general were
thought to be the route to achieving a balance between independence and
accountability for independent counsels. The result, however, is that today,
as in 1973, the special counsel can be dismissed by the DOJ. There is thus
little protection against a recurrence of what happened to Archibald Cox
on President Nixon’s orders in the “Saturday Night Massacre,” and indeed,
President Trump very nearly did fire Robert Mueller.
In 2017, Congress considered legislation that would have protected
Mueller from being fired except for good cause,145 but the bill, despite being
sponsored by Trump ally Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), never passed.
During consideration of that bill, constitutional law experts like Akhil Amar,
who derided Morrison, were called to testify about the “unconstitutionality”
of Congress constraining presidential removal power and Trump’s “right”
to fire Mueller.146 As we have explained, we strongly disagree with Amar.
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Whatever the case may have been in 2017, given the abuses of the Trump
DOJ since, there should be skepticism about delegating so much responsibility over the special counsel to the attorney general. By contrast, during
the Trump administration, federal judges—even Trump-appointed ones—
were sometimes more courageous, both in standing up to the administration and in their willingness to criticize the DOJ.147 Restoring to the federal
judiciary a role in supervising an independent counsel, as provided for in the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, might therefore be an attractive option.
The federal judiciary would likely provide a better constraint on presidential
abuse of power than the attorney general, underscoring the wisdom of the
arrangement in the 1978 independent counsel statute.
Even recognizing the risks of runaway independent counsels, the importance of accountability in preserving the rule of law still speaks in favor
of restoring the independent counsel law, albeit with careful reflection on
checks that can be put in place for the special counsel. A compromise position, however, might be a statute that leaves DOJ special counsel regulations
in place but requires the DOJ to appoint a special counsel in certain specified circumstances, such as a criminal investigation involving the president,
a former president, or persons close to the president. The statute might or
might not require a judicial finding of “cause” for the attorney general to
remove the special counsel—the most contentious point of any independent
counsel law. If removal of the special counsel by the DOJ were permitted,
the statute should require the attorney general to notify Congress in writing of the reasons for removing the special counsel,148 and to appear and
testify before both houses of Congress to answer questions about the circumstances of the special counsel’s removal and plans for appointment of
a new one.

Protect Special Counsel Investigations
Through Revised Obstruction Laws

Despite the change in control of the Justice Department in January 2021,
there is ample evidence that DOJ political appointees’ decisions concerning
a president, including even a former president of the opposite political party,
are highly deferential to the president.
In theory, there is protection beyond the mere powers of a special coun-
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sel in federal law. Federal obstruction of justice law already criminalizes
the removal of any prosecutor, whether by the president or anyone else, for
the purpose of interfering with an ongoing investigation.149 Special Counsel
Robert Mueller expressed a similar view in volume II of his 2019 report.150
In addition to reviving the special counsel legislation, Congress should also
consider amending federal obstruction of justice law to make clear that if
any prosecutor is fired for the purpose of obstructing an ongoing investigation, the firing would violate federal obstruction of justice law.151
It is also important to protect against efforts to obstruct investigations through the destruction of documents or through denying the special counsel’s access to information needed to encourage a thorough and
fully informed investigation. Following the precedent established in United
States v. Nixon, there must be compliance with special counsel subpoenas
of the executive branch, including those issued to the White House.152 If a
new independent counsel law is enacted, it should include a provision for
expedited judicial review of special counsel subpoenas that are challenged.
Accordingly, the destruction of government documents and other records
from previous administrations, or from the current administration, should
not be tolerated.153 Any destruction of government records should trigger a
DOJ investigation, not just an investigation inside the agency where the destruction of the document occurred. As discussed in the preceding section,
the RDI program should have been the subject of a special counsel investigation during the Obama administration, if not the Bush administration, and
destruction of relevant documents would have undermined that investigation if it had occurred.154 The DOJ needs to make clear that destruction of
government records in any executive branch agency will be investigated as a
possible criminal offense and may be prosecuted as such.

Protect Federal Prosecutors

Appointment of U.S. attorneys for fixed terms would avoid some of the problems that occur when U.S. attorneys are removed for political reasons, including reasons that may amount to obstruction of justice.155 U.S. attorneys
could be protected from removal by a statute that provides for fixed terms
in office—for example, ten years. Initial terms could be staggered to assure
that each presidential term has an equal number of vacancies to fill. Such a
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statute could prevent the president from removing a U.S. attorney for anything else but cause. While such an arrangement would have required the
Biden DOJ to retain some U.S. attorneys appointed by Trump, the Trump
DOJ also would have been required to retain some U.S. attorneys appointed
by Obama. All of these U.S. attorneys would still work under the supervision
of the attorney general, but such an arrangement very likely would provide
more checks and balances in the DOJ than there are today, when a president
can fire and replace all of the U.S. attorneys at once. Of course, any such
reform would need to account for the myriad contingencies of professional
life, such as a U.S. attorney who resigns or dies. In these instances, the sitting president should be allowed to nominate a replacement for the remainder of the unfinished term.
Like the independent counsel statute, a restriction on the power of the
president to remove United States attorneys would be subject to constitutional challenge on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the president’s
Article II powers.156 While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully address how insulating a U.S. attorney from presidential removal can nevertheless coexist with the extensive removal powers the court has recognized
in Myers, CFPB, and PCAOB, it is clear from cases like Morrison that the two
are indeed reconcilable.157 Indeed, in 2020 the Supreme Court held in Trump
v. Vance that the president is subject to criminal process, including the subpoena power of a prosecutor.158 Given the unique functions of prosecutors,
who are responsible for enforcing existing laws—not making policies or
promulgating regulations159 —providing job protections for U.S. attorneys is
within Congress’s mandate.
Other parts of the DOJ also should be insulated from partisan politics,
even when the president’s removal powers are recognized as fully applicable. The DOJ should accordingly enhance the role of its career attorneys in
policy decisions as well as decisions in individual investigations, civil cases,
and criminal prosecutions. One way to do that is to reduce the number
of political appointees in the DOJ. This could be the number of presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed (PAS) appointees or the number of
middle-ranked Schedule C positions filled with political appointees chosen
by the PAS appointees.160 Another approach is to require the DOJ to document, in writing, material disagreements between career DOJ attorneys and
political appointees unless the political appointees defer to the career attor-
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neys. Such documentation should in most instances be shared with congressional oversight committees upon request. Yet another priority should be
enforcing existing civil service laws that prohibit politicization of the hiring
process for career civil servants, and that provide job protections to career
civil servants in the DOJ and other federal agencies.161 Political appointees
should not be allowed to intrude into the hiring, evaluation, promotion, and
firing process for career civil servants. If existing statutes and regulations
are not sufficient, they should be tightened by amendment. The Office of
Special Counsel, which is charged with enforcing the civil service laws and
the Hatch Act, should strengthen its enforcement activities and keep a close
watch on the DOJ.
Finally, ethics statutes and regulations do not change from administration to administration and should not be interpreted based upon political
ideology.162 Most DOJ ethics officials are career DOJ attorneys rather than
political appointees and, with civil service job protections, are well suited
to give ethics advice that may not be popular with senior DOJ officials.163
Congress should require, preferably by statute, the DOJ to disclose to Congress instances in which a presidentially appointed DOJ official intentionally
disregards the direct advice of DOJ ethics lawyers.164

Add Legal Protections and Heighten
Responsibilities for Inspectors General

Some instances of criminal conduct in the executive branch are never referred to the DOJ because the conduct is not reported and investigated in
the agency where it occurred.165 This is usually the job of agency inspectors
general (IGs), who need independence and cooperation from other executive branch officials to do their job.166 Inspectors general are part of the executive branch, but they also have a critically important independent role
in investigating abuse in their agencies as part of their mission to “promote
integrity, efficiency, and accountability.”167 Inspectors general are frequently
the bearers of bad news and negative information, as the officers tasked with
verifying compliance with laws, regulations, and policies within their respective governmental agencies. It is important to protect IGs from reprisals, lest the agency and the government writ large lose the primary benefit
of the IG position.
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As evident during the Trump administration, inspectors general who
failed to toe the party line were fired or forced to resign by the president.168
In at least one case, namely, the firing of Michael Atkinson, the inspector
general of the intelligence community, the dismissal took place with the endorsement of the attorney general.169 For IGs to be sufficiently independent
that they feel free to report wrongdoing in the agency to which they are assigned, the ability of the president to fire them must be limited, compatible
with prevailing Supreme Court guidance regarding limitations on the scope
of the president’s removal power.
One approach is to have fixed terms for IGs as suggested above for U.S.
attorneys. Appointment of inspectors general for fixed terms would avoid
some of the problems that occur when IGs are removed in the middle of
investigations. Inspectors general, like prosecutors, do not have a policymaking role in the executive branch, making the case for unrestrained
presidential removal power under Article II of the Constitution a weak one.
Although there is uncertainty about whether a statutory restriction on presidential removal power is constitutional, we believe it is essential to the independence of an inspector general.170
Other than giving inspectors general fixed terms in office and making
them removable only for cause, other protections should be given to IGs to
enable them to do their job free of interference. Sometimes the investigative
work of IGs will displease political superiors and even the president, but it is
important that this work continue undisturbed. Additional regulations, and
perhaps also criminal statutes, may be needed to prohibit interference with
the independence of the IGs. All persons including the president should be
subject to those same regulations and statutes.
Inspectors general should also report information to Congress not only at
the conclusion of investigations, but also in appropriate circumstances at the
outset or during an investigation, and IGs should not be removed by the president for fulfilling this duty. OLC opinions stating that IGs do not have to report
certain information to Congress before the conclusion of an investigation—
including the opinion OLC rendered in 2019 in connection with the Ukraine
whistleblower171—should be rescinded. Better yet, such reports by IGs to Congress should be specifically required by an amended statute.
Finally, inside the DOJ itself, the inspector general needs the power to
proceed promptly and unimpeded with investigations of alleged wrongdo-
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ing. Unlike most other federal agencies, the DOJ has a separate Office of
Professional Responsibility.172 Investigations should not languish under the
“exclusive jurisdiction” of the DOJ’s OPR173 before the IG begins to investigate. In addition, IG reports to Congress should not be delayed because
there is also an OPR investigation. This goal would be assisted by the transfer of some responsibilities from the OPR to the DOJ IG. The Inspector General Access Act of 2019 (S. 685 / H.R. 202) provided for this needed change
and had sponsors from both sides of the aisle.174

Expand Recusal of Presidential Appointees

DOJ attorneys appointed by the president should recuse from participation
in criminal cases and investigations in which the president has a personal
interest. Generally applicable recusal rules for particular party matters in
the executive branch,175 if properly interpreted, would preclude political
appointees from participating in some of these cases, but these rules are
too subjective, and waivers are too easy to obtain. Bright-line recusal rules
in the DOJ are therefore needed. A preferable approach is to embed this
recusal rule in a federal statute to ensure it cannot be undone by executive
order. The point is simple: in a democratic society, criminal investigation
and prosecution decisions turn on the facts and an evenhanded application of the law, not on personal favoritism or politics. DOJ attorneys close
to the president should not decide whether to investigate or prosecute the
friends, family, or enemies of the president.
DOJ’s presidential appointees should recuse from any matter involving
the president in a personal capacity, the president’s family, business entities
owned by the president, and the president’s campaign. Other items on the
recusal list should include matters involving close associates of the president and people appointed by the president to positions in the United States
government. Presidential appointees in the DOJ probably should also recuse
from matters involving members of Congress and candidates for election
to Congress, as well as matters involving presidential candidates and their
families. Another category meriting recusal of presidential appointees in the
DOJ involves investigations and prosecutions of people whom the president
has identified as requiring investigation even before they are charged with
a crime.176
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Most of these matters can be handled by career DOJ attorneys in the
main Justice Department or U.S. attorneys’ offices with supervision by a
senior career attorney rather than by very senior officials appointed by the
president. If additional supervision of a matter is required, a senior career
DOJ attorney from another part of the DOJ or a different district can assume
that responsibility. For particularly complex matters, such as the 2017–2019
Russia investigation undertaken by Robert Mueller, a special counsel can be
appointed.
Finally, investigations and prosecutions involving a prior president or
the president’s family members or appointees also should be undertaken
by DOJ attorneys who are not appointees of the current president. For reasons explained above, a retrospective examination of potentially criminal
conduct in previous administrations is important for preserving and restoring democratic norms. But to avoid the appearance of retaliation against a
vanquished political foe by supporters of the winner, this task should not be
undertaken by DOJ attorneys who are appointees of the current president.

Enhance Protections for the Intelligence Community

Many lessons regarding the intelligence community emerged from the 2016
election. Some suggest the need for greater protection for members of the
intelligence community who are faithfully trying to protect U.S. national
security, but others suggest a need for greater transparency on the part of
intelligence agencies as well as more careful adherence to agency protocol.177
Following a sustained attack on the intelligence community on the part of
the Trump administration, former members of the Obama-era intelligence
community were repeatedly targeted by both the president and the DOJ,
with public attacks as well as counter-investigations into the origins of the
Russia probe.178 In particular, as discussed above, the investigation by Special Counsel John Durham held out hope for Donald Trump of exposing
a conspiracy on the part of the Obama administration to bring down the
Trump campaign.179
The DOJ investigations occurred simultaneously with investigations
by three committees in the Republican-controlled Senate, in which former
members of the intelligence community or those involved in the Russia probe
on the national security side were placed on a subpoena list.180 Neither the
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DOJ investigations nor the Senate investigations appear to have borne fruit.
The highly awaited Durham probe, in particular, ended up a great disappointment to the former president when Durham told Barr, who in turn notified
Trump, that Durham would not be able to issue a report prior to the election.181 A December 2019 report by DOJ Inspector General Michael Horowitz
meanwhile found that the Russia probe was correctly predicated and duly
authorized under law, meaning that the FBI had met the legal criteria for
undertaking the investigation under the circumstances.182
Nevertheless, these counter-investigations and the suspicion they raised
of the FBI may have caused lasting damage to the United States intelligence
community. At the same time, the Horowitz IG report identified significant
difficulties within the FBI, ones that must be attended to going forward.
In an earlier, August 2019 report, for example, Horowitz found that there
were leaks in connection with Crossfire Hurricane and that then FBI Director James Comey was himself responsible for leaking sensitive information
that he should have kept confidential.183 Horowitz also identified difficulties of accountability within the FBI, and noted that Crossfire Hurricane
was started by career officials who had not run their investigative plans all
the way up the chain and, most notably, had not consulted with the DOJ as
per agency guidelines.184 He also discussed the low threshold for opening an
investigation of a political campaign in the first place, which is necessarily politically sensitive,185 as well as a lack of care and diligence in presenting information honestly to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
court judges.186 This latter point became apparent when Horowitz examined
the highly controversial wiretap and other surveillance that was ordered
on Carter Page, a member of the Trump campaign. While there were good
grounds to be concerned about Page’s contact with the Russians, Horowitz
found FBI agents failed to reveal that Page had previously provided information to another U.S. intelligence agency and therefore the level of suspicion of his activities might have been exaggerated.187 Nevertheless, Horowitz
concluded that “we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence that
political bias or improper motivation influenced the FBI’s decision to seek
FISA authority on Carter Page,”188 which was at the heart of the objections to
Crossfire Hurricane raised by Donald Trump and his advisors.189 The report
therefore suggested that the probe of Page was warranted and no laws were
broken. But the report also pointed to the need for greater care in adhering
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to agency protocol, as well as much greater attention to agency guidelines
for ensuring the confidentiality of intelligence within the department.190
Although the December 2019 Horowitz report largely vindicated the FBI
and Crossfire Hurricane, some important lessons emerged from it for the
department and the intelligence community. Carelessly handled DOJ investigations in the intelligence community could compromise sources and
methods of obtaining intelligence, and the Horowitz report pointed to the
need to handle that risk with greater care.191 In addition, there must be better
coordination with the DOJ surrounding sensitive political probes, especially
those with a significant criminal dimension. While the CERL/CREW report
identified concerns with DOJ restrictions on FBI intelligence protocol,192 it is
also the case that the DOJ must have an opportunity to weigh in on criminal
investigations from the outset. This suggests that the DOJ should engage in
better coordination with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), and that the ODNI inspector general’s office should have enhanced
opportunities to guide DOJ investigations within ODNI. The DOJ should
be required to coordinate with the ODNI IG’s office to make sure investigations do not compromise the quality of U.S. intelligence or unfairly intimidate intelligence employees.193

Restrict Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion
to Domestic Considerations

With the exception of cases like those involving extradition, which necessarily involve negotiations with foreign governments, the DOJ’s prosecutorial decisions should not be affected by U.S. interests relating to foreign
countries. As shown by Bill Barr’s overtures to a wide array of other nations
in support of Trump’s illegitimate attacks on the Mueller investigation, the
potential for abuse is great. It can take the form of American politicians
seeking to involve foreign nations in politicized DOJ activity, or of foreign
governments seeking to involve the United States’ criminal justice system
in political disputes abroad. DOJ requests from a foreign nation for legal assistance, as well as DOJ willingness to provide legal assistance to a foreign
nation, should be justified on law enforcement grounds. And given the possibility of mixed purposes in a case involving the prosecution of a foreign national, Congress should act to prohibit the exercise of federal prosecutorial
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discretion with regard to domestic considerations and thus forbid trade-offs
based on foreign relations. Although there are some restrictions built into
the system by the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which requires
individuals or organizations who engage in political activities on behalf of a
foreign principal to register with the DOJ,194 there are few constraints that
would limit the DOJ from using its prosecutorial authority to secure the assistance or cooperation of a foreign nation.195 While such decisions may on
occasion occur in even a healthy democracy, the potential for abuse makes
such trade-offs too risky and ultimately untenable in an agency that strives
to adhere to rule of law values.
Examples of prosecutorial abuses during the tenure of Bill Barr include
the aforementioned attempts by President Trump to persuade Australia,
Ukraine, Italy, and the United Kingdom to assist Attorney General Barr in
a counter-investigation of the origins of the Russia investigation.196 Trump
administration discussions with Australia197 in particular may have matured
into cooperation that reportedly also involved the United States in Australia’s negotiation for the release of hostages in a third country, Iran.198 Sometimes, foreign governments seek to influence criminal investigations inside
the United States, as the Turkish government allegedly did in asking the
Trump administration to scale back a criminal investigation of Halkbank,
a politically influential Turkish bank, by the U.S. attorney in the Southern
District of New York.199
Cooperation and coordination with other nations in criminal investigations is sometimes appropriate. The United States has entered into mutual
legal assistance treaties (MLATs) with other nations, and these arrangements are helpful in combatting crimes that cross international boundaries,
such as narcotics trafficking, sex trafficking, money laundering, and terrorism.200 Prosecutors are urged to consult the DOJ’s Office of International
Affairs (OIA) to determine whether the United States has an MLAT with a
country from which evidence or other cooperation is sought. This procedure
is a shortcut for the DOJ because it is considered faster and more reliable
than letters rogatory—that is, a formal request from a U.S. court addressed
to a foreign court and asking for assistance in a particular matter.201
The United States should of course abide by its treaty obligations and,
when appropriate under these treaties or when letters rogatory are obtained
from a court, should call upon foreign nations for reciprocal legal assistance.
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Such requests should also be reviewed by career DOJ lawyers, not just political appointees, and the requests must never be politically motivated. In addition, they should fall squarely within the treaty obligations or treaty rights
of the United States. Most importantly, any such agreement between U.S.
law enforcement and a foreign nation should be as transparent as possible;
secret deals in this domain are almost always highly suspect. Congressional oversight committees—the judiciary and intelligence committees of the
House and Senate—should be informed of instances in which foreign legal
assistance is requested or given, and the reasons therefor.

Enhance Privacy Protections for Journalists and Private Citizens

Finally, we return to the abuses that occurred with regard to journalists,
members of Congress, and private citizens. These are difficult to correct,
and there is a long and complex history regarding the reach of DOJ’s investigatory powers. The surveillance of journalists and members of Congress
and their families discussed above is particularly concerning, all the more so
given that these investigations were judicially authorized. As a result, there
is now a House review of the surveillance of lawmakers and journalists, an
internal Justice Department review of the surveillance, and a review by the
inspector general for the DOJ.202 The critical question is what Congress will
eventually do with the information it receives. Will it stand up to executive
branch overreach or will it once more defer to the executive branch, even
when the security and privacy of its own members are concerned?
The surveillance of journalists and members of Congress suggests the
need for congressional reform of the DOJ’s investigatory powers as well as
constraints on the willingness of federal judges to acquiesce to executive
branch demands. Surveillance that targets domestic subjects, let alone government officials, is justified under the Constitution only under the most
extraordinary of circumstances, notably where the target is being directly
investigated for the commission of a crime and the methods of surveillance
fully satisfy the subject’s Fourth Amendment rights. Federal courts should
be particularly parsimonious with authorizing surveillance of journalists,
as such surveillance can easily infringe upon their First Amendment rights.
Surveillance and other forms of interference with a free press will over time
prove particularly damaging to democratic governance.
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Conclusion

The CERL/CREW working group concluded that Donald Trump’s Department of Justice “compromised the interests of the United States and jeopardized our national security by failing to enforce the law evenhandedly.”203
At a minimum, the department undermined public confidence by creating
the perception that the law was being used as a political tool to support the
reelection of the president. In some cases, the working group concluded,
Attorney General Barr went so far as to violate rules of professional conduct and government ethics rules. The working group also expressed great
concern about lack of congressional oversight of the DOJ and refusal of the
attorney general to cooperate with Congress.204
Barr’s leadership of the DOJ provided a test case for the ability of the
department to withstand political pressure from the White House, allowing for an evaluation of whether adequate protections are in place to guard
against the politicization of the department’s core functions. The Trump
DOJ failed that test miserably, thus exposing weaknesses in the current legal
framework by which the department functions. In the case of Barr, who substantially shared the president’s autocratic view of presidential power, the
constraints that the DOJ observed were too often based on political consequences rather than a sense of duty or fidelity to the law. 205 This suggests
that the current guardrails that are in place to ensure that DOJ conforms to
the rule of law are inadequate to protect against the destructive force of an
attorney general who views his or her own extensive authority as flowing
from a nearly unbounded view of presidential power.
Congress needs to be more assertive in exercising its authority under
Article I to oversee the conduct of the DOJ and other executive branch agencies and departments.206 Although Article II puts these agencies and departments under the authority of the president, Congress sets their budget.207
Congress should use the power of the purse to assure greater accountability
from the DOJ. This includes requiring regular testimony from the attorney
general before Congress and compliance with congressional subpoenas.208
At a minimum, the elected representatives who decide disbursement of
public funds are entitled to information on how that money is being spent
by executive branch agencies, including the DOJ, and as part of the budgetary process, Congress should make sure that information is provided.
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During the Trump administration, the DOJ transitioned from a department that regarded itself as bound by the rule of law to a department that
treated law as a tool for achieving political ends and that treated adherence
to law as optional. Using law as a weapon against political enemies poses a
lasting threat, both to the integrity of the DOJ and to the United States’ ability to protect democracy against erosion due to weakening moral and legal
standards.209 The American people can no longer afford to rely on the softer
constraints of conscience or political opprobrium to constrain an attorney
general intent on abusing her or his authority. It is time for a second major
reform effort, in the spirit of the Levi-Bell reforms, to return the Department of Justice to being a champion of the rule of law, and to restore confidence in the impartiality of its operations and comparable independence
from White House political pressures.
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